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Abstract 
Insurance fraud and abuse—international concerns—are inherent in the proposition of insurance 
and prevalent in insurer-insured interactions.  While the subject of considerable industry and 
regulatory attention, this little-researched area of consumer behavior and consumer ethics 
represents persistent social policy questions and problems at multiple levels.  This paper 
addresses the issue by first defining insurance fraud and its origins in contract, as well as 
consumer- and insurer-management.  The authors conclude by re-envisioning the problem as one 
of co-creation by the consumer-insured and insurer personnel, proposing a framework for its 
study and resolution. 
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Introduction 
 
Effective market relationships hinge upon good-faith exchange and in the consumer setting the 
most prevalent and costly examples of dysfunction may be those of consumer insurance fraud 
and abuse.1
Industry redress of the problem of insurance fraud/abuse within the property-casualty segment 
has varied, contingent upon its nature.  In the United States, solutions range from consumer 
education and policy disclosures intended to raise awareness of illegitimate/unethical consumer 
behavior, to the formation of large, well- financed Special Investigative Units (SIUs) by insurers 
to investigate claim validity and pursue fraud and abuse not only through claim denials, but the 
courts (Dornstein, 1998; Hays, 2010).
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  Industry has also formed inter-organizational coalitions 
to exchange information and coordinate law enforcement cooperation, addressing shared losses, 
and thereby, shared interests  (Lesch and Byars, 2008).  And, in 2000, and 2005, the industry held 
“roundtable” discussions among system constituents (industry representatives, consumer groups, 
law enforcement, and academia) exploring the use of regional and national public communication 
campaigns—a form of social marketing—to reduce the economic, ethical and legal issues 
(Coalition Against Insurance Fraud, 2000; 2006).   
Separate from contractual obligations, legislative and regulatory frameworks, and/or legal 
interpretations of either, consumer morality, and insurer morality are social constructions in 
which deviance from the negotiated norms represent violations of social expectations.  Industry 
offers a dual response to consumer transgressions by a) framing and reinforcing honest and loyal 
behavior, and b) identifying and deterring abnormal (fraudulent/abusive) behavior.  Very little 
research has emerged on attributions of insurer morality.  As such, insurance fraud originating 
from either source is an important but under-studied aspect of the marketing process centering on 
the ethical component.   
 
This paper opens by describing the context of property-casualty insurance fraud/abuse as it arises 
during the process of exchange, and then models the conflict between the parties to the 
relationship as a matter of contract (breach), normative incongruence, and dysfunctional co-
production.  The authors conclude by posing a series of propositions for how to examine 
insurance fraud in the context of contemporary marketing concepts.  The focus is upon single-
claims fraud/abuse mostly associated with the property-casualty segment of the insurance 
industry, and to the exclusion of the involvement of organized crime syndicates.3
 
   
Origins of Fraud/Abuse in ‘Moral Hazard’ 
 
The contractual view on the origin of fraud is rooted in the agreement of the parties, described by 
Smith and Roberson (1971; p. 1166) as  
 
2 
 
“…a promise by one person (the “insurer”) to pay a sum of money or to give something 
of value to another (“the insured or a “beneficiary”) upon the happening of a contingency 
or fortuitous event which is beyond the control of the contracting parties and in which the 
promisee has an interest apart from the contract.” 
 
In so doing, the insured transfers risk (of loss) to the insurer, and for consideration (premium 
paid), the insurer agrees to indemnify the insured for losses sustained.  Owing to the asymmetry 
of information between the parties, both are subject to the perils of moral hazard, e.g., the failure 
of either to behave diligently or in good faith at any point in the exchange (Ericson, Doyle and 
Barry, 2003, p. 11), thereby increasing (decreasing) the likelihood of circumstances resulting in a 
valid, approved/claim paid.  Baker’s (2000) review of the concept of moral hazard reveals the 
rich historical dimensions, including those arising from the character of the insured/claimant that 
led to its treatment as a risk itself.   Actuarial practice may account for this as a cost for a segment 
of business, underwriting having accounted for the quality of applicant, and the claims 
department evaluating for fraud and abuse.  Dornstein (1998) affords a colorful and evolutionary 
account of the express forms of expression of moral hazard in the property-casualty business in 
the United States, including the role of organized crime and the rise of insurer efforts in response.  
The CAIF publishes a weekly electronic newsletter with contemporary examples of fraud and 
abuse advanced by both parties—insured and insurer.4
 
  Thus, the very existence of insurance as a 
market proposition inherently sets the stage for fraud and abuse.    
In this exchange, consumers have largely been the focal point for the study of fraud, although 
state regulators and the courts function as insureds’ venue to address complaints concerning so 
called “bad faith” and other unprofessional if not illegal transgressions by insurers.  For example, 
early evidence from one study suggests that actual paid-claims were found to be substantially 
higher in one state (Washington) where statute provided for individual action against insurers 
believed to have unreasonably denied a claim (Insurance Research Council, 2009), although in 
most states tort remains the basis for action (Tennyson and Warfel, 2008).    Ericson and Doyle 
(2006) report the results of interviews of sales and management personnel in the life insurance 
industry in Canada and the United States, concluding that deceptive practices in that segment are 
prevalent and institutionalized, and that regulatory efforts fall short of needed consumer 
protections.  Berardinelli (2008) has outlined recently- revised claim settlement practices at one 
large property-casualty insurer in the United States (Allstate) which he asserts places profits 
above policy-holders, resulting in “…consistent underpayment of claims…” (p. 43).  Allstate has 
argued otherwise of course, although it has recently (2010) agreed to the terms of a multi-state 
settlement with implications in all locales in which it does business, addressing its use of 
software, claimant communication and other matters associated with claims management and 
regulatory oversight (Hunter, 2007;  Multi-State Market Conduct Regulatory Agreement, 2010). 5 
It is clear that asymmetries of information on the part of both parties provide fertile ground for 
persons or companies whose motive(s) are less than pure.  The public conceptions of fraud and 
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abuse are next explored from the vantage of the current weltanschauung, a decidedly static, if not 
one-sided perspective focused on the consumer-insured as the source of the dysfunction. 
The Prevalence and Public Acceptance of Consumer Insurance Fraud/Abuse 
 
Literature on insurance fraud reveals myriad approaches to what constitutes fraud, how much of 
it occurs, and how it may be differentiated from abuse (Lesch and Byars, 2008; Tennyson, 2008).  
At one extreme, an alleged insurance fraud may only be validated through adjudication, 
producing estimates of prevalence of less than 1% of otherwise suspicious claim-referrals in a 
large state data base analyzed by Derrig (2002).  Deigned “provable fraud,” (Derrig, p. 275), the 
resulting ratio of merely suspicious referred-claims to those validated by a competent judiciary 
was approximately 25:1.  Note that suspicious claims account for but a small portion of total 
claims processed by an insurer.  Of the roughly 48 million claims processed by U.S. insurers in 
2009, about 85,000 were identified as worthy of referral to the industry database utilized by the 
NICB (Pugh, 2010).  On the other hand, the measurement and management of so-called “soft” 
fraud involving for example, “padding” and/or “buildup” should be routinely addressed by claims 
personnel during the claim-adjusting process, where more obvious although “forgivable” 
infractions may be negotiated.  This may serve both an educational as well as promotional 
function in customer relations.  The most egregious cases may not only be denied, but many 
states require referral to a state fraud bureau for possible further criminal investigation and data 
warehousing.    
 
Estimates of the prevalence of claims including fraud/abusive practices vary depending upon the 
nature of the insurance context, settlement standards and business practices, nature of loss, and 
even region of the country, (e.g., 2003, Burger).  For example, studies by the Insurance Research 
Council (IRC) of closed claim files (those in which a payment was made), show that “buildup”—
the inflation of an otherwise legitimate claim, was present in twenty per cent of bodily injury 
claims it reviewed in a sample taken in 2007, up from eighteen per cent in 2002 (Corum, 2008).  
Other IRC studies have demonstrated dramatically higher rates of utilization of medical services 
following auto accidents in New York City in comparison with the remainder of the state, even 
when the economic losses were similar, suggesting localized buildup (Pitman, 2006).  The same 
study attributed buildup in nearly one-in-two of closed claim files (42%) of those originating in 
the city; but only seven per cent of those from the remainder of the state.  These abuses, whether 
arising from weather catastrophe, context of an auto accident, or other loss are often referred to as 
opportunistic fraud since they coincide with a potentially covered event.   
Broadly speaking, consumer fraud/abuse may occur at any stage in the exchange, from 
application (e.g., misstating annual auto mileage, failing to reveal pre-existing damage to a 
covered item), to exaggerated injuries, “invented accidents,” or conspiracy with network service 
providers.   
 
Since insurance fraud/abuse arises from moral hazard, studies of public mores and attitudes 
addressing honesty, claimant behavior, and level of tolerance toward illegitimate practices have 
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been undertaken by the industry.  Academic researchers have only more recently begun to 
characterize contributing factors.  
 
A brief summary of large-scale, industry-sponsored survey studies was performed by Lesch and 
Byars (2008), tracing to the early 1990s and involving organizations such as the IRC, the CAIF, 
and the consulting organization Accenture.  Perhaps the most insightful of these have been 
conducted by CAIF (1997; 2007) warranting further detailing here.   
 
The 1997 CAIF-sponsored national telephone survey revealed that large numbers of consumers 
believed it commonplace for claimants to engage in various forms of insurance fraud/abuse (e.g., 
padding, misrepresentation of an incident, application fraud, falsification of receipts, failure to 
disclose prior damage).  Justifications that were examined included recovery of premiums, “fair 
return” on premiums, belief that insurance companies profit at the expense of insureds, and 
attribution that rate- setting includes a component to cover fraud.  Lesser agreement (< 50%) was 
observed for the level of (dis)respect shown to insureds from insurers, implicit reactions to what 
may be perceived bad faith on the part of insurers, and the perceived prevalence of 
misrepresentations on insurance applications (“nobody tells the truth on insurance applications”). 
Nearly two-thirds (63%) of respondents reported that the single largest deterrent to the 
commission of an insurance fraud was an insured’s moral character (CAIF, 1997, p. 15.)   
 
Subsequent clustering of respondents based upon their attitudes toward fraudulent activities 
produced a four-group solution.  Respondents least tolerant of fraud were labeled moralists 
(31%), followed by realists (persons with low tolerance, but cognizant of its occurrence and 
rationalizing some behaviors; 22%).  Conformists held fairly tolerant attitudes toward insurance 
fraud, in part owing to their perceptions of how commonly it occurs, finding it more acceptable 
(26%), while critics expressed the highest tolerance for fraud, attributing fault to insurers and 
seeking little punishment for infractions (21%).  Analysts reported few meaningful demographic 
differences across the segments. 
 
The study was replicated in 2007, and CAIF reported substantive declines in the number of 
participants who believed it unethical to misrepresent facts on an insurance application, file a 
claim for prior damage, inflate a claim to cover a deductible, and/or misrepresent an incident to 
pay for an uncovered loss (CAIF, 2008, p. 1). 
 
A secondary analysis of the 1997data (Tennyson, 2002) showed males more than twice as likely 
as females to approve of fraudulent behavior, with differences also noted on the basis of income, 
region of the country and self-reported size of resident community.  Persons with recent claims 
experience were found to be less approving of fraudulent behavior than those without such 
experience, leading the researcher to conclude that experience with the claim adjustment process 
may reduce propensity to engage in illicit acts. 
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The New York Alliance Against Insurance Fraud (NYAAIF) commissioned a state-wide study of 
consumer perceptions of the types and prevalence of insurance fraud, including general attitudes 
toward the issue (NYAAIF).  More than one-half of those participating agreed that insurers 
“make too much money,” with a nearly equal number (77%) reporting that it was not appropriate 
to inflate a claim to recover premium payments.  About one-half (49.6%) agreed that rates are 
based on the prevalence of fraud (“everyone submits some false claims”).  
 
Conceptual Contributions to Understanding Consumer Insurance Fraud/Abuse 
 
Limited strides have been made by researchers in framing the issue.  Essentially three approaches 
were identified by Tennyson (2008):  a moral-sociological, moral- psychological, and a 
contractual-economic.  We first extend her distinctions, and then introduce two, additional 
approaches:  social construction, and that of customer as co-creator.     
 
Moral-Sociological, and Psychological Approaches to Claimant Behavior.  Put simply 
psychology looks at individuals, at intra-individual mind-states and processes, and at intra-
individual-level explanations of insurance consumer ethics, or in this case dishonest insurance 
consumer behavior; sociology does not.   Studies of the issue from the sociological point of view 
have approached insurance fraud/abuse largely as a matter of social morality, i.e., how “right,” or 
“wrong,” or “justified” would a consumer-insured be in committing a proposed insurance 
fraud/abuse.  Psychological perspectives focus on intrapersonal theories association with 
individual motivations, the maximization of individual goals, and internal processes.  In the latter 
case such processes may include intrapersonal calculations of financial gain/loss reduction, 
estimates of the likelihood of detection, and/or retributive behavior (penalties).  Published studies 
have been limited to scenario analyses (descriptive and projective), and have used both students 
as well as adults in field settings.   
 
Wilke (1978) reviewed adult projections of the morality of fifteen (15) fraudulent consumer 
actions including a case of insurance build-up and found that 79% of respondents viewed “over 
claiming on insurance” as “definitely wrong.”  Rallapalli et al (1994) examined the role of 
personality traits in decision making entailing ethical dimensions, including a posed insurance-
fraud including a fabricated incident.  Overall, correlates of proffered illegal activity included Ss 
need for autonomy (+) and risk propensity (+), as well as the need for social desirability (-) and 
problem solving (-).  
 
Brinkmann (2005) investigated insurance fraud as an opportunistic test of morality in a German 
student sample, and using scenario analysis demonstrated a modest-strength relationship between 
respondent willingness to “misrepresent facts for obtaining insurance”  and/or “deliberately 
exaggerate an insurance claim,” and one’s level of morality.   In a follow-up (Brinkmann and 
Lentz, 2006) comparing Norwegians and Germans, insurance fraud was relatively more 
acceptable than e.g., drinking a can of cola in a supermarket without paying for it or changing a 
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price tag (to a lower price tag) in a retail store. Norwegians tended to find insurance claim 
exaggerations and misrepresentations on insurance applications less acceptable than their German 
counterparts.  Their cluster analysis-based typologies approximated those obtained earlier by the 
CAIF (1997). 
 
Reconciling sociological and psychological influences, Tennyson (2008) and Brinkmann (2005) 
reference the potentially powerful explanans of rationalization and/or neutralization by claimants 
(see Sykes and Matza, 1957) to harmonize differences between personal beliefs/morality and 
social acceptance.  A recent scenario-based test by Miyazaki (2009) varied a contract factor (level 
of deductible), social justice (insureds’ perception of fairness in claim resolution), and level of 
insureds’ ethics to ascertain projected level of claim settlement and the ethical appropriateness of 
claimant “padding” behavior.  Results revealed that higher deductibles posed a potential 
justification for insurance fraud/abuse, that it would indeed be viewed by respondent insurers as 
“fairer” and that claimant behavior to recover the deductible at progressively higher amounts 
would be viewed as less unethical.  Persons with lower ethics scores tended also to see unethical 
behavior as less unethical than those with higher ethics scores, and the deductible-ethics score 
interaction was such that those with lower ethical scores tended to attribute the expected claim 
award as less than in the case of higher deductible amounts.   
 
Dean’s (2004) scenario analyses found no relationship between the attributed behavior of the 
insurer or its agent (pro- or anti-social), and the social class of the claimant (upper-class/high 
income vs. blue collar/modest income) on perceptions of claim padding.  Women, however, made 
stronger moral judgments about the appropriateness of padding than did men, although 
respondents overall awarded nearly twice the claim required by the contract ($987 vs $500), 
explained by respondents as justifiable on the basis of uncovered losses (inconvenience, 
emotional stress, sentimental value). 
 
Contractual-Economic.  In the range of approaches to managing insurance fraud/abuse, this 
venue conceives of illicit claimant behavior as expected, and manageable through institutional 
response.  Thus, through decisions in the selection of clientele in underwriting decisions, rate 
setting based on assessed risk, and administration of claims through validating and valuation 
processes, fraud and abuse may be deterred if not minimized as a cost of doing business.  Perhaps 
the bulk of industry resources have been devoted to deterrence as the strategy of choice in 
addressing the fraud/abuse problems.  From this vantage, all applicants/claimants present with the 
element of suspicion, and every claim must undergo investigation and evaluation against the 
terms of the insurance contract (Hirsch, 1999).  Various models for the management of all 
(suspicious) claims have been advanced (e.g., Derrig, 2002), most employing layered 
sophistication in the processing of claims. These may range from claim-scoring for probable 
fraud/abuse (routine, qualitative scrutiny against a battery of fraud indicators--flags) to methods 
far more sophisticated (statistical techniques used in mass processing of claim files; see e.g., 
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Dionne, Giuliano and Picard, 2003; Derrig, 2002).  Throughout, the management of fraud/abuse 
are viewed by firms as business propositions. 
 
Deterrence is costly, requiring extensive human and physical resources at several levels.  A study 
by the Insurance Research Council (1997) showed that most of the property-casualty insurers in 
the United States had developed internal SIUs (76%), with more than 90% of the nation’s largest 
insurers having such programs (Insurance Research Council, 1997; Insurance Service Office, 
2000).  All large insurers had SIU programs in situ, with more than two-thirds of medium-sized 
insurers reporting that they did, as well.  The report underscored the lack of uniformity in state 
approaches to the issue, a finding echoed in the recent study by the Insurance Information 
Institute (2010), revealing the presence of state fraud bureaus in 42 states and the District of 
Columbia.  This decentralization of approaches to enforcement of anti-fraud legislation is 
consistent with the relegation of regulation of insurance activities to the states as a result of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945.  The industry has established two organizations key to 
detection and clearing of fraudulent claims outside of those processed internally, including the 
National Insurance Crime Bureau (comprised of investigative staff and claims-data collection 
services) and the Insurance Services office (warehousing and processing of suspicious claim 
referrals).  While return on investment (ROI) may be expected to differ among insurers 
(heterogeneous managerial practices), ROI during the late 1990s was reported to be in the 
neighborhood of approximately 27:1 (Insurance Information Institute, 2010).  Earlier, one large 
insurer reported a return of $6 for every $1 spent on internal special investigators (Anderson, 
1990). 
 
Yet, post hoc industry surveys of paid, closed claim files continue to reveal the widespread 
presence of fraud and abuse even after deterrent efforts.  How can this be explained?   
  
8 
 
Insurance as a Social Construction 
Baker’s (1994) narrative-based analysis of the insurance process and case law surrounding 
adjudication of bad faith claims illustrate the tension between parties to an insurance contract.  
The need for the insurance product is rooted in dependence of the insured upon the insurer’s 
promise to pay, recognizing that the insurer must balance the claim against the future needs of 
other policy holders as well as a profit motive or its equivalent.  To the extent that an insurer 
avoids-reduces payments, it ensures a pool of funds for future claimants, the insurer enjoys a 
smaller loss ratio and may increase its profitability.  The sales story however, (posed by the 
marketing departments of the industry), does not disclose this fact, rather, choosing to emphasize 
only the value of security resident in the promise, ambiguously conveyed through symbols and 
slogans with which we have all grown familiar:  Good Hands, Good Neighbors, and so on.   
 
Moreover, as credence goods, the typical insured knows very little about the specific terms of 
coverage. As pointed out by Glenn (2003), the exchange begins with the insured’s application 
and payment, and is then followed by issuance of the contract without ex ante review of the 
terms.  In this context, consumers buy what they cannot fully know, or understand.  Moreover, the 
level of information in the environment is such that there is virtually no way for the consumer to 
evaluate quality of performance ex post, since few consumers actually annually initiate a claim 
and no comparative environmental data on insurer performance (e.g., processing methods, 
processing time, benchmarks for valuation, bad faith prosecutions, valuation practices) is 
available (Schwarcz, 2009).   Search and decision parameters are limited to price, and resulting in 
what Schwarcz has termed the ‘race to the bottom’ of quality.  The paucity of insights into the 
value of the insurance proposition, extant insurer claims practices, and complexity of insurer 
bureaucracy necessitate insurer construction of what Baker has termed sales stories. These 
promotional distillations comprise the positioning strategies of the firms and are largely devoid of 
comparative attributes useful to decision making about insurance, or, insurers.  
Claims stories, (used by claims personnel and claims departments), on the other hand, bring the 
conflict between the firm and its (larger) pool of policyholders on one hand, and the motives of 
the individual claimant on the other, into sharp relief (Baker, 1994).  Here, in the presence of 
conflict, the industry employs three typical recitals:  a) the responsibility to define and enforce 
the limits and terms of the policy, b) the obligation to the larger community of policy-holders by 
maintaining solvency, indeed, the very institution of Insurance, and c) the obligation to identify 
and deter any fraud/abuse by insureds as a moral/legal requirement. 
 
Thus, the public construction advanced by insurers and shared by customer-insureds is one of 
promise, security, protection, and guardianship (Stone, 1994).  The private exchange at the 
moment of claim presentation, as a matter of contract, reverts to the terms of the contract.  The 
resulting gap—public proclamation vs. private practice--has increasingly (though not 
consistently) been filled by judicial opinions expanding contract terms in redress of claim denials 
(Baker, 1994).  The positioning strategies of firms, void of any hard attributes, create 
expectations beyond the capacity of the firm to deliver in all cases, with the resulting customer-
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insureds’ surprise if not dissatisfaction with firm performance.  Ericson and Doyle (2003) are 
concerned with changing and widening the perspective from focusing on individual-
psychological and sociological explanations of customer dishonesty to how the insurance system 
and its agents respond as a “private justice” or rather “private injustice” system, in which the 
insurer system  internalizes and then actually instrumentalizes fraud (see esp. pp 319, 322).  
Instead of treating insurance fraud as something clearly given (a factual breach of penal law 
norms or contractual conditions), insurance fraud is also understood as a system element, as 
something which is constructed (measured, defined, negotiated) and managed in insurer-insured 
interactions.  Under such circumstances, (including a lack of involvement by the insureds in the 
creation of policy terms and bureaucratic practices), it becomes easier to understand some 
insureds’ pure or rationalized behavior toward insurers to include illicit activity (claim padding, 
buildup), or other attempts to recover deductibles, or treat insurance as a financial investment 
from which a return should be expected.  These behaviors may result from simple ignorance, 
and/or may reflect a measure of rationalizing to neutralize a less than ethical act with the tacit 
understanding that “everybody does it” and/or the cost is “built in” to the policy premium.  
Consistent with industry surveys on acceptance of fraud and abuse, additional explanation may 
be found in the notion of opposition norms advanced by Nee (1998).  Some insureds (e.g., the 
militant-critics) represent a segment with values inconsistent with authority (insurers) and the 
latter are tolerant of them.  Both parties are aware of the “slippage” surrounding settlement 
practices, and both agree on both sides, that “Everybody does it.”   
 
This is directly analogous to Torgler’s (2008) contention that deterrence alone cannot reduce the 
incidence of tax fraud and that tax compliance is dependent upon a prevailing tax morale (Torgler 
et al., 2008).  This may consist of a mix of social and psychological norms (e.g., societal 
acceptance; familial approval) and can be related not only to gender and education, but the 
quality of tax administration, notion of fairness, as well as trust, obedience, and awareness of the 
tax system. Studies of projected insurance claimant behavior, as research (above) has shown, 
suggest that similar factors are at work.   
 
From this vantage, industry shares responsibility for reinforcement of illicit consumer behaviors.  
The contemporary insurance exchange process has created contradictory propositions of value.  
This conflict is at least in part, a derivative of the ‘goods-based’ conception of the marketing 
process, and demonstrates the inadequacy of the traditional (transactional) marketing paradigm in 
the value proposition for insurance services.  Insureds are dissatisfied, as are insurers.  
 
This review has demonstrated that the prevailing relationship between the insurer and the insured 
is one wherein customers are viewed as recipients of a service product and originators of 
dysfunction in the exchange, i.e., insurance companies are in the business of selling coverage for 
covered perils, as defined by the terms of the contract and interpreted by the policies and 
procedures of the management of the firm.  Customers are inherently untrustworthy, and a sizable 
portion will behave opportunistically as a matter of personal gain, or, social expectation.  In order 
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to maintain their fiduciary obligations to shareholders/members, and society, insurers argue that 
they must treat claims and customers with suspicion and impose procedures and deterrents to 
safeguard the integrity of the exchange and the larger society.  Insurers however, contribute to the 
dysfunction in the system of exchange by failing to educate insureds as to proper claimant 
behavior (promotional simplifications; failure to address credence qualities in administration of 
service).  Insurer business motivations may result in inconsistencies in the claims process and 
confusion among insureds concerning terms of coverage.  The resulting lack of perceived 
reliability in the insurance product/service exchange has eroded trust between the parties and 
fosters high social and economic costs.   
 
In this context, a new conception of insurance service and insurance fraud are needed.  
 
 
Consumer Insurance Fraud/Abuse:  Through the Lens of Marketing 
 
The field of marketing is amidst a paradigm-shift from traditional focus upon the sale of goods to 
one customer concentric in which the parties to the relationship share, or co-create value (Vargo 
and Lusch, 2004; Lusch and Vargo, 2006; Sheth and Uslay, 2007).  From this vantage, the very 
reason for the existence of a firm centers on satisfying the needs of the customer.  The authors 
contend of course, that a primary source of discontent and mistrust of insurers among customer-
insureds and insurers is the gap between expectations and performance—adhering to both parties.  
One solution may be to re-frame the very insurance proposition from this new point of view. 
From this vantage, insurance is formally not a good, and the value of the insurance proposition is 
resident in the qualities of the interaction.  The dysfunction may then be dissected according to a 
series of tenets central to successful marketing of services.  From this vantage, we depart from 
three pillars:  a) customer as the co-creator of a service, b) the origin of value propositions and c) 
the service-centered view.    
The Customer as Co-Creator 
 
Authors Vargo and Lusch (above) have rightly distinguished between the co-production and co-
creation of value.  Value (like beauty) always resides in the eye of the beholder (customer-
insured), and as an over-arching construct.  The customer-insured is involved in co-production 
throughout the insurance exchange, including for example the provision of information (used in 
underwriting, the actuarial process and claim settlement), the provision of time and shared risk 
(deductible), and engagement in networks of service providers (e.g., claims representatives, 
health care providers, repair services) satisfying the shared objective of ‘wholeness’ as proposed 
and ultimately satisfied by the insurer.  Control over the selection of some, if not most of these 
extended networks (e.g., auto repair, health services) also participating in the co-production may 
reside with the customer-insured, or, with the insurer.  Resultingly, the co-production of value is 
in many ways both observable and tangible, and the role of the consumer-insured central to its 
conception and consumer satisfaction.   
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If consumer-insureds are uncertain of their role(s), are uncertain about the terms of coverage, and 
are not expert in the insurance administration process, these uncertainties are sure to contribute to 
lower expectations for trust and performance and higher uncertainty when confronted with a 
claim- opportunity.  In fact, in many cases, the resolution of an insurance claim typically does not 
occur until or unless the totality of the claim has been established.  Until that point, the customer-
insured does not know the disposition of the value proposition, and does not know the 
“production” being undertaken by the insurer in the processing of the claim.  This gap may be 
filled through the provision of information and education on desired role(s) and behavior to be 
undertaken by the consumer-insured, and greater disclosure by the insurer in first-party claims of 
the procedures and applicable standards in the event of a claim.  So-called third-party claims 
would of course, warrant disclosure of the latter at the moment of the loss.  Van Raaij and Pruyn 
(1998) outlined a staged-model for characterizing the service process addressing the nature of 
service validity (does the service address what the customer wants) and reliability (level of 
performance realized from the service provision).  Unfortunately, there is little opportunity to 
specify/customize property-casualty contracts or bureaucratic services in today’s market 
environment (low validity), and as a credence good, the considerable uncertainty in delivery 
(issues of reliability) looms large.  Regulators are not generally in a position to regularly 
review/approve internal processes associated with claims management other than by exception 
(consumer complaint)).  And, in the recent Allstate settlement (above), funds were directed to the 
education of regulators in the very processes and standards used by Allstate.  Ambiguities abound 
in this soup of services. 
 
Authors Van Raaij and Pruyn further posited five factors mediating the customer’s processing of 
the service encounter, including equity (perceived fairness in disposition of the service; equitable 
transactions are fair transactions), discrepancy (consumer involvement in co-creation of the 
service will reduce the gap between what is experienced and what was expected), control (ability 
to exert influence of varying types and at different stages in the service encounter), attribution of 
effects (inference drawing about causes of better or worse service performance), and self 
perception (perceived role of self-contributions to service).  These touchstones can be considered 
to frame consumer expectations, and as such, also represent standards of utility in insurer audits 
of successful (or not) consumer-insurer interactions.  No published studies within the whole of 
this model have been advanced at this point to directly investigate the same. 
 
Practically, this value-based perspective affords potential for competitive advantage, as detailed 
by Lengnick-Hall (1996).  Success will hinge upon the alignment of production needs (insurer-
side) with consumer expectations, requiring greater provision of information about the value 
proposition process as also outlined by Van Raaij and Pruyn (above).  For large numbers of 
consumers, the service encounter at least in part, does not “map” satisfactorily.  Survey research 
has established large gaps with respect to perceived equity, and this may/may not be related to the 
notion of discrepant role-playing throughout the encounter.  Some evidence has emerged to 
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suggest that the equity issue derives from corporate mission and practices.  Competent discharge 
of role by consumers may not address the independent question of equity.  Depending upon the 
nature of the claim, consumer control may be expected to vary, and raises challenges to both 
parties of the encounter.   
 
An important distinction in this regard can be found in the differences in approach taken by 
insurers to first-party claims (a policy-holder/customer incurs a loss), and third-party claims (as a 
result of tort, the liability portion of insurance applies, i.e.,  non-policy-holder claimant injured 
through negligence by the insured).    As a result of the adoption of no-fault auto rules in some 
states (14), the insurers “work out” the losses of both parties and appeals to the courts for 
reconciliation are barred based on certain monetary thresholds.  Otherwise, the general rule is that 
under the terms of first-party coverage, the insurer is required to behave in good faith as a matter 
of contract, going so far as to place the demands of the claimant ahead of their own in resolution 
of the claim (    ).  In the third-party scenario, the insurer (under subrogation) has no such duties 
to the claimant, rather, assumes the role of defending the insured behaving in such ways as to 
“…vigorously fight every claim brought against them with the single-minded goal of minimizing 
expenses…” (Mootz, 2003, p. 474).  In such circumstances, the posture of the parties is decidedly 
antagonistic and may invite bad faith by either party in an attempt to obtain an ‘equitable’ 
disposition.  The power of each in this relationship is very disproportionate and has led some 
courts and legislatures to require good-faith dealing even in the case of third-party claimants 
(Mootz, 2003).   Similarly, survey research (above) has underscored the predisposition of some 
consumer segments (e.g., ‘Critics’) to attribute gaps in perceived quality to insurers. 
Predispositions of claimants in the property-casualty setting carry a certain ‘victim’ quality which 
requires in itself careful managerial attention if the relationship is to be successful, and accurate 
attributions of responsibility for success are to accrue.  Ironically, the essence of insurance is to 
“make whole” a claimant, but the reality in many cases leaves much to be desired. 
 
As a matter of relationship development, the specification by insurers and assumption by 
consumer -insureds of competent, customer role(s) at various stages in the process is necessary.   
Since motivation levels for participation in the process differ, and since some customers should 
be expected to resist this change in relationship, a transition will be required.  Success will 
depend heavily upon coordination of corporate resources to this new way of thinking about the 
customer and adaptation of current processes to be more inclusive of customers as partners in 
production, rather than so exclusively as purchasers or users of fixed goods.  Moving from a 
perspective of suspicion, to shared responsibility may require greater modification of internal 
procedures among some insurers, than others.  And, since insurer standards for what constitutes 
the bases for a legitimate claim settlement can be expected to vary widely from insurer to insurer, 
a platform for consistency (validity) assumes a critical role.  The very heterogeneity of claim 
settlement practices extant throughout the states and among insurers as a result of firm 
differentiation and regulatory distinctions, pose formidable challenges in this respect.  As Derrig 
has pointed-out, there is little agreement among insurers on what constitutes a “fraud,” although 
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there is likely to be greater consensus in the definition and treatment of abusive practices. In this 
regard, the regulatory role of the NAIC, comprised of representatives from the states, must 
become more pronounced.  In the most recent multi-state settlement for example, monies are to 
be made available by Allstate to educate regulators on virtually all aspects of its software used in 
certain aspects of auto liability settlements in order that a proper regulatory function can be 
achieved.  This settlement, without direct participation by the NAIC, extends to all 50 states and 
the District of Columbia.  This illustrates a gap between the advance of the industry, and the 
status of capacity among regulators to carry out their function in the public interest, that in small 
part will be addressed through the terms of the agreement.  
The Value Proposition 
 
The core proposition in the insurance exchange is defined by the firm as the promise of 
indemnification at a certain level upon notice of a covered risk within a timeframe defined by the 
parties.  At present, this is an inherently transactional perspective.  The value proposition as 
perceived by the customer-insured may involve numerous additional dimensions consistent with 
expectations of service management, but the primary value proposition as well as satisfaction of 
value as created, becomes mostly (and perhaps only) tangible during the process of claims 
settlement.  As Baker (1994), Stone (1994), and Schwarcz (2009) have pointed out, this is 
necessarily a highly heterogeneous, if not diffuse, proposition depending upon the nature of the 
gap between the claimant’s construction and that posed by claims personnel.  This gap can be 
construed at the intersection of the beliefs of the customer–insured about delivery on the promise, 
their role as co-producer of value, and as realized through the firm’s settlement procedures.  
Firms may operationalize the value proposition differently based on a range of factors, over time, 
as a function of firm goals (Ericson, Doyle and Barry, 2003; Ericson and Doyle, 2003; 
Berardinelli, 2008), the regulatory environs, and the nature of the consumer-insured.  This places 
complex burdens upon insurers that interfere with the reliability of service delivery, and 
contribute to consumer-insureds’ confusion about appropriate behaviors.  The opportunity for 
dissatisfaction is great, owing to the complexity of such credence products and how they are 
administered and negotiated with insureds.   As a result, the construction of ‘appropriate claimant 
behavior’ is defined differently by customer-insureds as compared with insureds (Ericson and 
Doyle, 2003; Baker, 1994), as survey analyses have underscored (above).  Underscoring this 
issue, the insurer MetLife recently reported the results of a survey of Americans in which it 
revealed that nearly one-half (46%) could not report the level of coverage for the contents of their 
homes, with nearly three-quarters (71%) reporting that their coverage included full-cost 
replacement of the structure in the event of a total loss.  In the latter case, most coverages are 
limited to current market value, which historically has been less than replacement (Metlife Press 
Room, 2010a; Metlife Press Room, 2010b).   
 
The nature of insurance as a service defined in part by discrete events outside of the control of 
either party has enabled if not perpetuated the transactional paradigm.  Insurers can do more to 
facilitate quality customer experiences by re-framing of the role of insurance.  The result should 
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be the reduction of alleged insurance fraud and abuse brought about by enhanced trust.  How the 
consumer is engaged prior to any covered event, how the relationship is cultivated and 
maintained, and how covered events are managed through to claim payment and thereafter, all 
represent phases of engagement and relationship development that can clarify and inform 
consumer insureds about shared responsibilities in this heavily regulated service context.  These 
present as opportunities to build trust, awareness and comprehension of the value proposition as 
mutually defined within the framework of the regulatory confines.  As a matter of social 
construction, and more than reaction to a covered event as defined by credence qualities, insurers 
can be seen as co-responsible for the high levels of insurance fraud and abuse by single 
claimants, much of which is defined ex post facto.  Tennyson (2002) found for example, that 
claimants more familiar with the claims process held attitudes toward fraud different from those 
who had not had such encounters, underlining an opportunity for agenda-setting.  Recent research 
by Lesch (2010) demonstrated a monotonic relationship between age, and the perceived ethicality 
of five (5) illicit claimant behaviors, such that younger consumers were much more tolerant of 
the same.  This underscores the role of customer as product advanced by Lengnick-Hall (1996):  
customers can be and most likely are changed as a result of their consumption of the insurance 
services and managing this change to the mutual benefit of the parties presents an exceptional 
opportunity to insurers and consumer insureds alike in the redress of insurance fraud and abuse in 
society. Greater insurer disclosures of the process—its expectations of consumer-insureds and 
disclosure of its unique terms and procedures of claim adjustment will enable higher levels of 
efficiency in the marketplace, and engender greater trust in the relationship. This will necessarily 
prompt greater differentiation in the service proposition, innovations which must of course, pass 
regulatory muster.   
 
The role of integrated communications in this process can hardly be overstated.  Internal 
communications focused on the consumer-insureds’ brand experiences, across all phases and as 
interpreted to the contexts of production among all contact points with the firm (including third-
party users) will assume critical roles in re-framing the insurance proposition.  The role of social 
marketing in the creation of a more uniform set of expectations for what constitutes illicit 
behavior was earlier emphasized by Lesch and Byars (2008), its success likely to co-vary with 
consistency of message to the regulatory and deterrent environs among the various states.  This 
presents as a separate but critically important challenge to such regulatory ‘captains’ as the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners.  
 
Service-Centered 
 
Relationship management is central to a service orientation, and according to Vargo and Lusch 
(2004, p. 11), achieving customer satisfaction is inherently a collaborative process, one in which 
trust is central to success (e.g., Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  It is clear from this review that trust, by 
definition, poses a challenge to both parties, and warrants attention not only for customer-insured 
satisfaction, but for its contribution to redress of insurance fraud/abuse.  Lengick-Hall’s (1996) 
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characterization of the role of the customer in co-production illustrates the many opportunities for 
interaction between the customer-insured and the insurer in this context.  Therein, the customer-
insured is a resource (as above), a co-producer (as above), a buyer, a user, and in some respects a 
good-in-process, since the consumptive act (claim resolution) is expected to change the customer.  
Each of these roles represents a point of collaboration (service) warranting review between the 
parties.  None has been effectively elucidated in the literature on insurance as a process, nor, have 
researchers attempted to conceptualize this particular service proposition and decompose its 
elements.   
 
The tensions extant within the firm as it undertakes the claim processing phase of customer 
service, however, were the subject of ethnographic research undertaken by Morley et al. (2006) in 
review of  British firms’ claims handling practices.  There, organizational goals associated with 
claims processing efficiency were held above those of fraud detection.  Claims handlers employed 
non-express, as well as express models of fraud detection, mostly centered on the identification 
of anomalies in the “claims stories” presented by claimants, with the most successful (second-
level) claims handlers utilizing a “framework of suspicion” as they assessed claim validity (p. 
175).  Resultingly, the management of anomalies only rarely resulted in the development of a 
suspicion and many false-negatives escaped scrutiny.  The qualitative studies of Ericson and 
Doyle (2003) demonstrate the differential behaviors of claims staff in characterizing both 
claimants and their claims, the difficulties in categorizing fraudulent behavior and industry 
approaches to managing uncertainty (loss ratios) beginning with the selection of insureds and 
policy rates, including the management of network providers, and the impact of the claim 
assessment on the relationship to the insured exchange process.  These processes do not in all 
cases bear directly on the veracity of claimant statements or validity of a particular claim, rather, 
they present as business propositions.  The picture painted by analyses of more than 200 
qualitative interviews with industry personnel in Canada and the United States is one of 
relationship management, where fraud tolerance is an accepted element in the dialectic.  Again, 
the underlying lack of validity in the service proposition engenders expectations inconsistent with 
the goals of each party:  good faith relationships. 
 
These studies also demonstrate the lack of reliability in delivery of the insurance proposition, 
perpetuating and reinforcing self deception (Mazar and Ariely, 2006), the tendency to discount 
false information in a biased, self serving manner.  The prevalence of self deception is well 
known to both parties to the insurance proposition.  Palasinski (2009), also operating in the 
British context, interviewed a small sample of adult, male drivers to ascertain their conception of 
the exchange between consumer-fraudsters and their insurer, testing the validity of a typical 
“flag” used by insurers to screen fraudulent claimants (aggressive interactive behavior at the level 
of the dyad).  Thematic analyses of qualitative narratives of respondent projections of how 
deception occurs in this setting were consistent with self deception in both verbal and nonverbal 
modalities, and inconsistent with the standard established as a “flag” for deceptive behavior. 
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In sum, dysfunctions in the relationship between the insurer and customer-insureds are not totally 
the realm of responsibility of consumer-insureds.  Credence qualities of insurance, the manner in 
which the relationship has been negotiated and industry-wide promotion practices focusing on 
abstract promises, rather than experiential aspects of performance are contributory to the failed 
system.  Moreover, studies have demonstrated a lack of reliability in the delivery of a 
standardized value proposition, contributing to a large gap between expectations and performance 
of the insurance proposition.  Society itself has cast insurance as institutionalized governance, but 
one without transparency, shared responsibility in production and consumption in the reduction 
of shared risk.  Consumers buy what they cannot know, while insurers deliver an inconsistent 
experience in a regulatory environment that differs across the state markets.   
 
In this essay the authors have outlined the nature of consumer insurance fraud and abuse in the 
property-casualty industry, as first defined by insurers, then more completely to include the 
consumer involvement and interest.  The economic and social harms associated with this jointly-
held problem are considerable and continue unabated despite the provision of considerable 
deterrent resources.  Insurers contribute to the ills of the industry through lapses in validity and 
reliability in production and service delivery, and by failing to properly educate consumer-
insureds in their roles in the co-production of the value proposition.  Credence qualities of 
insurance have not been adequately addressed through contemporary insurance marketing 
practices and as a result, the value proposition as ambiguously conceived is also contributory to 
the issue.  
 
As such, what are the normative implications to managing this issue as society moves forward?   
 
Developing a Multi-level, Multi-unit Framework for Research. The paucity of research on a 
problem so widespread and of such economic and social implication is to these authors, 
inexplicable.  Scholarship on drug/alcohol abuse, for example, has posted barrels of ink, but 
perhaps owing to the structural (regulatory) isolation by society of the insurance industry, the 
topic of consumer insurance fraud has comparatively received little more than a comma in the 
social science and consumer behavior literatures.  All parties at all levels to this concern would 
benefit from the formulation of a multi-level, multi-unit framework for the assessment of the 
“how and why” of fraudulent and abusive insurance claimant behavior.  Figure One (1) outlines a 
point of departure.  As this review has suggested, the system of actors underscores the need for a 
variety of studies involving the several levels and units of analysis, research questions and 
methods of inquiry.  The authors therefore, propose a translational framework for the study of a 
societal issue, involving all levels of inquiry.  Units of analysis at this time are confined to the 
most basic level, those of the relationship between the parties to the insurance proposition as 
outlined within the framework of co-responsibility.  We propose for initial specification those 
terms and conceptual frameworks as outlined above.  Additional specification of units for 
analysis and interactions at higher (governing and enabling levels) are a necessity but by 
definition, beyond this treatise. 
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Figure 1 
The Hierarchy of Relationships and Elements in the System of Exchanges Surrounding Insurance 
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Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory Service Encounter 
 
 
Relations Between the Parties:  Insurer-Consumer Insured.  At this time, research has largely 
focused on intrapersonal processes utilized by consumer insureds to justify or rationalize their 
use of insurance in a certain manner (abusive or not). Moreover, most empirical research on the 
consumer-side has been survey-based, descriptive, and/or projective, with very limited exceptions 
involving observation or ethnographic research.  The authors are aware of only limited studies of 
counterpart constructions and accommodative-behaviors of adjusters during the dynamic process 
of claims processing (e.g., Ericson and Doyle, 2003; Berardinelli, 2008; Morley, Ball, Ormerod, 
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2006).  The nexis of the service encounter exists at this level and the literature has paid little 
attention to the contributions of / by the dyad as the claim is addressed and a mutually 
satisfactory / unsatisfactory outcome is obtained.    No systematic models of the process from 
dyadic viewpoints (consumer-insured or, adjuster, dual construction) on a dynamic basis have 
been advanced.  The richness of the exchange and interplay of the actors to this process remains 
largely unstudied.  This represents an untouched and necessary area of inquiry for the parties to 
the dysfunction.  The insurance proposition affords many opportunities for good-faith 
intercourse, all worthy of mapping and the application of auditing processes in order to ascertain 
the nature of compliance with standards of stated performance and expected value.  Value is, or is 
not, realized at this phase of the service process.   
 
Conceptually, units of analysis may include intrapersonal (norms, motives, expectations; both 
sides of the dyad), dyadic (coordinated construction of the insurance proposition and associated 
expectations depicted as phased interpersonal exchange), firm-level (organizational “rules” and 
norms, motives, expectations), as well as societal (inter-firm practices, regulatory oversight and 
standard-setting/assessment, judicial and legislative review).  At each level, units of analysis 
require specification and analyses.  To date, no translational framework has been advanced 
depicting the production and consumption of this value proposition in a unified manner.  
Available research has focused only very limited granular components (consumer attitudes, 
societal norms and expectations).  
 
Developing such empirical models may well require a summit-level assembly of representatives 
from all system actors, and requires a multi-lateral commitment to the value of the fruits of such 
studies to improved relations among the parties.  The current state of affairs is exemplary of the 
continuing if not “dangerous divergence” between marketing and society outlined by Sheth and 
Sisodia (2005) and is evidence in support of their call for a National Academy of Marketing.  Is 
the status of this issue not also exemplary of their call to “raise our aspirations” as a marketing 
community (Sheth and Sisodia, 2007)?  The gaps in performance outlined in this paper strongly 
suggest so.   
 
The Role of Ethics in the Value Proposition 
 
As this review has shown, moral hazard presents as an inherently ethical temptation (Brinkmann, 
2005) encountered and managed in many forms, and perpetuated by both parties to the insurance 
contract.  Historical, as well as contemporary polemics have largely focused on industry’s 
construction of insurance fraud and abuse as arising from ethical lapses by consumers, while 
emerging research has revealed how insurers participate in both the co-creation and perpetuation 
of fraud and abuse, and how state- and self-regulation are inadequate in redress of fraudulent and 
abusive insurer practices. As we have mentioned above, a new paradigm of insurer-insured 
interaction is necessary if the parties and society are to successfully alter their definitions and 
metrics of what constitutes insurance fraud and abuse—and achieve more satisfying market 
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relationships.   Put otherwise, how does one propose and then implement a new paradigm for an 
industry, one predicated on co-responsibility?6
 
  What will be the results of such a new 
perspective on the production and management of bad-faith practices as well as claimant 
fraud/abuse?   
Implications to Firm-Level Practices.  The insurance proposition is of mutual creation, bounded 
by regulation and involving the imposition of standard contracts, interpreted through myriad and 
separate corporate and competitive lenses.  As Lengnick-Hall (above) argued, the opportunity for 
competitive advantage will be enhanced among firms who recognize the value of customer as co-
creators and transition their systems to accommodate that point of view.  How to modify systems 
and relational dialogue challenges organizations to begin change at all levels?  Pilot programs 
involving regulatory and consumer interests may ease this transition, and prioritizing the 
management of market conduct is a first step.  In fact, NAIC has begun this journey, imposing 
reporting requirements on segments of insurers only recently, including reporting on management 
of claims and production of “scorecard ratios” as well as consumer complaints for performance 
review (see http://www.naic.org/industry_market_conduct_statement.htm for details).  Due to the 
level of data aggregation, however, this exercise may be of limited utility in the management of 
firm-customer relations, and inter-firm comparisons.  Re-focusing this process within the firm, 
and developing additional frameworks at more micro-levels proposed by Lengnick-Hall (1996), 
Vargo and Lusch (2004), and/or Van Raaij and Pruyn (1998) enables managers to observe and 
manage the insurance transaction/relationship more holistically.7
  
  Hopefully, such initiatives will 
foster insurance service innovation, improved customer satisfaction, efficiency of operations, and 
overall higher firm performance.  And, reduce the incidence of what are mutually defined ethical 
lapses.  Figure 2 outlines conceptual elements of the system necessary to accomplish co-
responsibility.  
This figure is meant to function as a summary of a key argument made in the paper and as an 
outline for future work ahead.  Ethics and the development of ethical propositions should 
encourage and assist marketing in rediscovering its normative content, in particular the ideal of 
taking co-responsibility for customer need-satisfaction, in this case risk transfer and risk sharing. 
On the other hand, as insurance marketing is not only about itself but shares responsibility with 
the two key professions of insurance, the actuarial sciences and the law.  The former establish the 
boundaries of core offering and design a sustainable pool in the first place, the latter take 
responsibility for specifying conditions and for making realistic promises, limiting expectations 
included.  Put simply (and of course repeating ourselves):  If insurance abuse is an example of 
risk and responsibility sharing (rather than something to blame and shame the most irresponsible 
risky customers), then traditional marketer, lawyer and actuarial work has only limited effect. 
These insurance professions should try to take their share of the responsibility by cooperating 
with one another and their customers, with a paradigm change in business model originating in 
the needs and expectations of insureds as a natural point of departure. Since insurance abuse is so 
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expensive as it is—by both parties-society can little afford not to innovate in its management.  
Enhancing ethical sensitivities of both parties is a necessary part of insurance marketing. 
 
 
The Value of Social Marketing. Social marketing (see Andreasen, 1993; 2001; 2006; Dann, 2010) 
represents an opportunity to internalize co-responsibility for societal goals on the strategy level, 
such as societal security and in this case fraud prevention.  The US insurance industry has 
coordinated national efforts around deterrence (e.g., formation of the NICB), and is engaged in 
the majority of the states.  Select US states have undertaken campaigns, with perhaps 
Pennsylvania as the longest-running example (http://www.helpstopfraud.org/), or New York 
(http://www.fraudny.com/) with localized efforts to combat insurance fraud and abuse. The 
common denominator of all such campaigns is the traditional insurance marketing paradigm, i.e. 
predominantly addressing the consumer side of the equation.  As the authors have demonstrated, 
a holistic approach is needed, which consequently includes the role of insurer practices.  Lesch 
(2005) has previously commented on the highly fragmented nature of consumer messaging to this 
point, a weakness of the status quo which can be overcome.  The Roundtable efforts of the CAIF 
and its partners can be read as recognition of the need to address one-way communication.8    
Recent research by Ericson et al. (2003) and Berardinelli (2008), and the Multistate Settlement 
speak volumes about the isolation of the industry from not only its customers, but regulators and 
society, as well.   These large, if not growing gaps between insurer practices on the one hand, and 
other system actors on the other, have largely gone without redress. 
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Reconciling the disparate claims adjustment practices—the ‘rest of the story’ outlined above—
must be undertaken if gains are to be stable and permanent.  Under the umbrella of a new 
paradigm for consumer-insurer relationships, a new morality as well as new insurance climate—
morale—must be formed if success is to be achieved.  Industry members must revisit what 
constitutes good faith practices in administrative procedures and their disclosure a priori to 
consumers.  This will only be realized if the conception of the customer shifts.  Overcoming the 
credence –quality gap, and obligating insurers to be proactive in the process of disclosure and 
education has been detailed by Widiss (1995) as well.  Then, among consumers—now 
participants in sharing responsibility for the administration of the service—a new morale could be 
expected to form.  This, the direct result of improved trust in the process of relationship building.   
Again, this will require a multi-lateral summit of sorts if gains are to be made in society’s well 
recognized problems with this issue. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 Estimates of inefficiencies in the U.S. property-casualty market vary widely, depending upon 
measurement and methods (Lesch and Byars, 2008), although the Coalition Against Insurance Fraud 
(CAIF) recently valued economic losses suffered by the U.S. property-casualty segment of the industry at 
$80 billion annually (Coalition Against Insurance Fraud 2008).  This number may understate the current 
situation as a result of the ongoing economic recession (Hays, 2010; National Insurance Crime Bureau, 
2009; Towers Watson, 2010).  Moreover, it has been suggested by various sources that between 3% and 
10% of the $2.3 trillion expended by U.S. public and private health care entities in 2007 were based in 
fraudulent claims, a minority of this attributable to actual patient-behavior (Rosenbaum, Lopez and Stifler, 
2009; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009).  Comparatively, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
reported that the tax gap—that amount of tax owed but unreported and unpaid—was (after enforcement 
and collection activities) about $290 billion in 2005 (The Department of the Treasury, 2009).   
2 The problem of insurance fraud/abuse is the subject of international concern as well (e.g., Montia, 2007; 
Ipsos-Mori, 2005; Jou and Hebenton, 2007; Lincoln, Wells and Petherick, 2003; Kim and Kwon, 2006). 
 
3Unfortunately, many authors do not distinguish among the categories and origins of insurance 
fraud/abuse in estimates of prevalence or valuation.   Unless otherwise indicated, fraud/abuse in this paper 
is limited to actions advanced by individual consumers associated with property-casualty claims.  
Criminal organizations (sometimes referred to as “rings,” or “medical mills”), or other multi-claim 
fraudulent applications involving multiple actors and levels of organization are excluded from 
consideration here, but represent serious challenges in their own right.   See Quiggle (2010) for examples 
of the nature and costs associated with criminal enterprise in the auto lines of property-casualty insurance 
fraud. 
 
4 See for example http://www.insurancefraud.org/.  
5 The final version of the multi-state agreement, including signature pages and a corrected state-by-state 
listing of total auto liability direct written premiums was obtained from the Illinois Department of 
Insurance, personal correspondence, January 26th, 2011. 
6 Cf about “rediscovering the normative roots” of insurance, as responsibility sharing together with risk 
sharing Brinkmann, 2010; Brinkmann and Doyle, 2010; Brinkmann, 2007. In such a perspective, the 
insurance business faces new opportunities and challenges at all levels. In the context of descriptive ethics 
research, the paradigm explaining moral hazard with moral neutralization among both insureds and 
insurers, is ripe for a similar paradigm change as we have inferred above. 
 
7 Another approach, more in the descriptive ethics and in the risk perception research traditions, will be 
the subject of an empirical pilot among insurance company staff with customers in Scandinavia, including 
customer ethics attributions, perceptions of company co-responsibility for the interaction climate, perhaps 
also including some ethical climate indicators (see Martin and Cullen, 2006 and Arnaud, 2010) 
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8 A combined descriptive ethics and risk perception research approach (cf note *4 above) has such mutual 
listening and two-way communication in mind, inviting both sides to self-criticism, to put themselves into 
the shoes of the counterpart. 
 
